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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a heated confrontation on the roadway, Jonathon Ellington was chased 
at high speed for miles by four individuals in two separate cars. Eventually, one of 
those cars cornered, and then essentially "T-boned," Mr. Ellington's vehicle. Following 
that impact, Mr. Ellington then crashed headlong into the second vehicle that had been 
chasing him, driving that vehicle off the roadway. As Mr. Ellington disengaged from the 
second vehicle and started to drive towards open road, one of the occupants of the first 
vehicle (who was by then outside his vehicle and positioned right near Mr. Ellington's 
passenger-side door) fired his.44 Magnum into the front quarter panel of Mr. Ellington's 
vehicle. Mr. Ellington sped off and, in the process, ran over and killed the driver of the 
first car. 
Mr. Ellington was charged with two counts of aggravated battery and one count 
of second degree murder. Although one magistrate judge refused to bind Mr. Ellington 
over on any of the original charges, the prosecution obtained a more favorable decision 
from a second magistrate judge and, thus, was allowed to bring Mr. Ellington to trial. 
Ultimately, a jury found Mr. Ellington guilty, and the district court imposed a sentence of 
25 years, with 12 years fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Ellington contends that his conviction was a result of bias and 
prejudice (much of which was brought to bear by means of misconduct), not a reasoned 
consideration of the evidence. In his original Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington asserted 
that (1) as part of a much larger pattern of trying to prejudice the jury, the State, with 
prosecutor Arthur Verharen at the helm, committed four distinct acts of misconduct; (2) 
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the district court erred in admitting certain highly prejudicial information; and (3) the 
entire panel of prospective jurors was tainted by comments made by three of their 
peers. In addition, Mr. Ellington argued that there was such an accumulation of errors 
in this case that he was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, he requested that his conviction 
and sentence be vacated, and that his case be remanded for a new trial. 
Following filing of the parties' opening briefs on appeal, evidence came to light 
indicating that one of the State's expert witnesses lied on the witness stand. 
Consequently, Mr. Ellington moved for a new trial, and this appeal was suspended while 
that motion was being considered and, ultimately, denied by the district court. Wishing 
to challenge the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial, Mr. Ellington sought, 
and received, leave to file the present Supplemental Brief. In this brief, Mr. Ellington 
raises an additional issue on appeal: whether the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The bulk of the facts relevant to this appeal were previously recited in great detail 
in Mr. Ellington's opening brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.2-28) and, therefore, need not 
be repeated herein. However, it is necessary to discuss the additional facts relevant to 
Mr. Ellington's latest claim concerning the district court's denial of his motion for a new 
trial. 
As was alluded to in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington presented a fairly 
substantial case during his trial in August and September of 2006. (See Appellant's 
Brief, p.27.) Critical to his defense was the testimony of William Skelton, Jr., Ph.D., an 
accident reconstruction expert. As was discussed in Mr. Ellington's opening brief (see 
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Appellant's Brief, p.16 n.27, p.20 n.34), Dr. Skelton opined that when Joel and Vonette 
Larsen's Subaru impacted the side of Mr. Ellington's Blazer, it caused the Blazer to 
rotate to the left, and that this rotation, combined with Mr. Ellington's attempt to steer the 
Blazer to the left to regain the roadway, caused the Blazer to turn left too hard and put it 
on a collision course with the Honda occupied by Jovon and Joleen. (Tr., p.1434, 
Ls.12-14, p.1439, L.1 - p.1440, L.20.) Dr. Skelton further opined that, given the 
Blazer's full acceleration and the Honda's location, Mr. Ellington did not have time to 
react before he collided with the Honda. (Tr., p.1447, L.3 - p.1448, L.3.) Critical to this 
opinion was Dr. Skelton's conclusion, based in large part on the location of the debris 
field left by the Blazer's collision with the Honda, that the girls' Honda was over the 
centerline and, thus, fairly close to Mr. Ellington's Blazer as it regained the roadway. 
(Tr., p.1440, L.21 - p.1443, L.10.) Also critical to this opinion was Dr. Skelton's 
assumption that it would have taken Mr. Ellington 1.5 seconds to perceive that he was 
on a collision course with the Honda, and to react. (See Tr., p.1447, L.4 - p.1448, L.9.) 
This 1.5 second perception/reaction time, Dr. Skelton explained, represents the average 
driver's perception/reaction time and is universally accepted and utilized in the accident 
reconstruction field. 1 (Tr., p.1424, L.16 - p.1425, L.9, p.1505, Ls.9-13.) Finally, 
Dr. Skelton opined that, given the speed of Mr. Ellington's Blazer after he reversed off of 
the Honda and tried to accelerate toward open road, and given the proximity of 
Mrs. Larsen's body to the Honda, Mr. Ellington had not had time to perceive and react 
to Mrs. Larsen's presence before his Blazer hit her. (Tr., p.1474, Ls.11-14.) Again, 
1 Dr. Skelton explained that this standard reflects an average perception time of 0.75 
seconds, plus an average reaction time of 0.75 seconds. (Tr., p.1424, L.16 - p.1425, 
L.1425, L.9.) 
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critical to Dr. Skelton's opinion was his perception/reaction time assumption-in this 
instance, that it would have taken Mr. Ellington 1.5 seconds to perceive and react to 
Ms. Larsen's presence. (SeeTr., p.1468, Ls.12-18, p.1471, L.15-p.1472, LA.) 
In its rebuttal case, the State offered the testimony of Corporal Fred Rice in the 
hope of undercutting the testimony of Dr. Skelton. (See generally Tr., p.1652, L.7 -
p.1685, L.11.) Cpl. Rice is a 25-year veteran of the Idaho State Police (hereinafter, 
ISP), and the head of the ISP's reconstruction and accident investigation program. 
(Tr., p.1652, L.19 - p.1653, l,2.) Among other things, Cpl. Rice challenged 
Dr. Skelton's reliance on the debris field in locating the zone of impact between the 
Blazer and the Honda (Tr., p.1659, l,24 - p.1660, L.13, p.1672, l,3 - p.1673, l,6), and 
he claimed that there is no such thing as an average perception/reaction time of 1.5 
seconds (Tr., p.1679, LsA-25). With regard to the debris field, Cpl. Rice testified initially 
as follows: 
Q. . . .. How precise an area can you put a collision at by looking 
at the debris field? 
A. Not at all. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. What happens is is [sic] during the collision, parts are crunching, 
glass is breaking. It can strike off of an object, bounce off of it, it can go in 
many different directions. In fact, it will absorb the speed of another 
obstruct [sic] that it strikes. So basically you know an accident happened 
someplace on that highway. 
Q. Does it have any reliability at all in terms of placing a vehicle in 
one lane as opposed to the next? 
A. No, we would look for the physical evidence. Debris can be 
moved, kicked around, like I said, it sprays. 
(Tr., p.1659, l,24 - p.1660, L.13.) Later, he testified similarly: 
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Q. (By Mr. Verharen) In terms of the debris field that we have in this 
particular case, maybe I should get to a photograph that shows it. 
Number 23 has a good view of the debris field. In this photograph 
number 23 there is debris in the eastbound lane, is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that any indication of where the actual impact occurred? 
Ms. TAYLOR: Objection, Your Honor, he has already answered the 
question about debris fields. 
THE COURT: He has. Hopefully his answer will be consistent. You 
can answer the question. 
A. I see a lot of debris all over the road here, it's not going to tell me 
where the point of impact happened. I see more in the westbound thaN I 
do in the eastbound. I see some-
Ms. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object, he's narrative again. 
THE COURT: I think he has answered the question. 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) Is there any way at all to put the Honda in the 
eastbound lane based on that debris field? 
Ms. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that. He has talked 
to him about the debris field and he's getting into another theory, should 
have been brought up in his case in chief if he wanted it. 
THE COURT: I believe he has already answered that question that he 
can't make that determination. I'll sustain the objection. 
(Tr., p.1672, L.3 - p.1673, L.6.) With regard to an average perception/reaction time, 
Cpl. Rice testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) Dr. Skelton put a 1.5 second reaction 
perception time on the contact between the Blazer to the Honda, do you 
remember that? 
A. I was in the classroom, or in the courtroom for that. 
Q. Is that applicable to this situation? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. Why not? 
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A. Number 1, there is no average perception reaction time in the 
world. 
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) What do you mean by that? 
A. There is no two people that see things, respond to them in the 
exact same way. You can not come up with an average time. Again, am I 
looking straight ahead? In the test that he talked about coming up with his 
1.5 average, was the person looking right at the back of the vehicle-
Ms. Taylor: Objection, narrative. 
The Court: Sustained. 
(Tr., p.1679, LsA-25.) 
Of course, the jury ultimately found Mr. Ellington guilty. Thus, it must have 
necessarily rejected Dr. Skelton's expert opinions. 
When Mr. Ellington filed his Appellant's Brief in this case, he argued that his 
conviction was a result of bias and prejudice (much of which was brought to bear by 
means of misconduct), not the jury's reasoned consideration of the evidence. However, 
at that time, Mr. Ellington could not have known the full extent of the State's misconduct. 
On June 24, 2008 (which was five days after the State filed its Respondent's 
Brief on appeal, but well before Mr. Ellington had had an opportunity to file his 
Appellant's Reply Brief on appeal), Mr. Ellington, acting through his trial counsel, filed 
(in the district court) a motion for a new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406, I.C.R. 34, and 
the Due Process and Fair Trial provisions of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
(Supp. R., pp.3-7.) The basis of that motion was that Mr. Ellington had recently 
discovered new, material, and exculpatory evidence which, in the interest of justice, 
necessitated a new trial. (Supp. R., pp.3-7.) Specifically, Mr. Ellington asserted that 
Cpl. Rice, the State's rebuttal witness, had lied. (Supp. R., ppA-7.) In support of this 
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allegation, Mr. Ellington provided the district court with transcripts containing Cpl. Rice's 
testimony in a previous vehicle-pedestrian collision case, State v. Ciccone, Elmore 
County No. CR-2003-4441.2 (See Defendant's Exhibit A (Cpl. Rice's trial testimony 
from the Ciccone case); Defendant's Exhibit B (Cpl. Rice's preliminary hearing 
testimony from the Ciccone case)l He argued that the transcripts containing Cpl. 
Rice's testimony in Ciccone, when compared to the transcript of his testimony in this 
case, reveal that Cpl. Rice has offered "diametrically opposed" testimony in the two 
cases concerning critical principles of accident reconstruction-namely, the reliability of 
the location of the debris field in determining the zone of impact, and the accepted use 
of perception and reaction times in the accident reconstruction field. (Supp. R., ppA-7.) 
The transcripts from the Ciccone case make it clear that, in the preliminary hearing in 
that case, Cpl. Rice had used the debris field to estimate the zone of impact: 
Q: Okay. Are you familiar with the term "point or area of impact?" 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What's those [sic] terms mean? 
A. Point or area of impact is usually a place where a collision takes 
place between two objects, either a car striking another car, or a car, in 
this case, striking a pedestrian. 
2 As this Court is already aware, Mr. Ciccone was also found guilty of murder and he 
also appealed. His appeal (No. 32179) was ordered dismissed by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals as having been untimely filed. On September 9, 2009, however, the Idaho 
Supreme Court granted review in Ciccone and assigned that case a new number (No. 
36877). Thus, the Ciccone appeal is still pending. 
3 Defendant's Exhibit A and Defendant's Exhibit B, neither of which was ever file-
stamped by the district court, were attached to Mr. Ellington's October 17, 2008 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial (which was also never filed-stamped 
by the district). (New Trial Tr., p.3, Ls.15-22.) Although they were not made part of the 
supplemental record on appeal, Defendant's Exhibit A and Defendant's Exhibit B (along 
with numerous other materials) are attached to Mr. Ellington's Motion to Augment 
Record, which is filed concurrently herewith. 
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Q. Okay. Were you able to determine an exact point of impact in 
this case? 
A. Exact, no. 
Q. Were you able to determine an area of impact? 
A. Oh, absolutely, yes. 
Q. How did you make that determination? 
A. .. " [W]e have our first headlight glass where it starts to show 
up on the ground. 
Now, knowing that an automobile was traveling when this impact 
took place, when the glass broke, it is not going to fall directly to the 
ground; gravity has to pull it. But the glass is going to travel what the 
speed of the car was. 
So if we just take some estimates, knowing approximately how high 
the glass was when it broke and things such as that, we can come back 
with knowing how fast the car was traveling and say, approximately, 
where the area of impact was. 
Q. Okay. So the area of impact to you is before the end of the 
rolling tire mark, or right at it, or right after it? 
A. I would say it would be before it. It couldn't be past it. 
Q. Okay. And why couldn't it be past it. 
A. The physics would not allow the glass to end where it does. 
(Defendant's Exhibit B, p.53, L.23 - p.56, LA; accord Defendant's Exhibit B, p.71, L.3-
p.72, L.5 (clarifying that, given the type of impact involved in Ciccone, the debris field 
was outside the area of impact).) Cpl. Rice's trial testimony in Ciccone was similar: 
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with a term-yes or no please-with the 
term zone of impact, impact zone? 
A. Sure. 
8 
Q. What is it? 
A. Impact zone is what they are trying to say is an impact happened 
somewhere within this area. And what happens is is [sic] we can see 
where the zone will be based upon if a vehicle is moving and is involved in 
an impact, then we have debris that shatters out from that. And so you 
are going to have a zone after that point. 
Q. Were you able in this case to determine-is there a way to find a 
more specific line of impact or zone of impact? 
A. Oh, as I stated earlier, there is no question that the right tire 
showed the point of impact. 
Q. Okay. Is there any other way other than that tire to determine if 
an impact was made in that area? 
A. Oh, absolutely. 
Q. How so? 
A. Well, we started picking up the glass because the headlight was 
broke. Now, as the vehicle is traveling and the glass is above the ground, 
when it is broke out, it is not going to fall immediately to the ground. It is 
going to continue on at the speed of what the car is until gravity pulls it to 
the ground. So, what's going to happen is it is going to travel a distance 
before it actually hits the ground. 
So, we see that the glass is at this point. So, if the automobile is 
traveling at any speed at all, that definitely coincides with where the 
impact point is. 
(Defendant's Exhibit A, p.1108, L.6 - p.1110, L.20.) 
The transcripts from the Ciccone case also make it clear that, in the preliminary 
hearing in that case, Cpl. Rice had used the same perception/reaction time standards 
that he scoffed at in Mr. Ellington's case: 
Q. On page 16 and 17 of your report-
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. -you have a combined maximum speed, unknown speeds, and 
then reaction distance. What are these? 
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A. . . .. [W)e're going to say that the person has reaction time, not 
perception time that I'm talking about, just reaction time. Using three 
quarters of a second that a person is going to react, that 51 miles per 
hour, approximately, about 54 feet for three quarters of a second. 
(Defendant's Exhibit B, p.65, L.25 - p.66, L.12.) 
On July 3, 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court suspended the present appeal 
pending the district court's ruling on Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial. (Supp. 
R., p.8.) 
On or about October 17, 2008, both parties filed in the district court their 
memoranda in support of their respective positions on Mr. Ellington's motion for a new 
trial. (Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial (Oct. 17, 2008); Brief in 
Opposition to Motion for New Trial (Oct. 17, 2008); see a/so New Trial Tr., p.3, Ls.15-25 
(revealing the date on which the parties' memoranda were filed)l In his memorandum 
in support of his motion, Mr. Ellington observed that there are two possible standards for 
evaluating a motion for a new trial-the four-part test articulated in State v. Drapeau, 97 
Idaho 685,551 P.2d 972 (1976), or the three-part test articulated in State v. Scroggins, 
110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985)-and argued that the Scroggins standard, which 
is a specialized test for situations in which there is claim of false testimony from a 
prosecution witness, ought to apply. (Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial, 
pp.1-7.) He then argued that, regardless of whether the Drapeau standard or the 
Scroggins standard applied, he was entitled to a new trial. (Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for New Trial, pp. 7-27.) 
4 Neither of the parties' memoranda was file-stamped by the district court; however, as 
noted, the district court stated they were both filed on October 17, 2008. (See New Trial 
Tr., p.3, Ls.15-25.) Both memoranda are attached to Mr. Ellington's Motion to Augment 
Record, which is filed concurrently herewith. 
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In its memorandum opposing Mr. Ellington's motion, the State assumed that the 
Drapeau standard applied (Brief in Opposition to Motion for New Trial, p.4),5 and it 
argued, inter alia, that the evidence concerning Cpl. Rice's false testimony: (1) is 
impeachment evidence and, therefore, is not "material"; (2) would not be likely to 
produce an acquittal; and (3) could have been discovered in the exercise of due 
diligence by Mr. Ellington's counsel. (Brief in Opposition to Motion for New Trial, pp.4-
7.) 
On October 20, 2008, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Ellington's motion. 
(See generally New Trial Tr.) At that hearing, respective counsel argued their positions, 
but no evidence was taken. (See generally New Trial Tr.) At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. (New Trial Tr., p.48, L.25 -
p.49, L.1.) 
On or about December 22, 2008, Mr. Ellington supplemented his motion for a 
new trial with two items: (1) an affidavit from Dr. William Skelton, Jr. (hereinafter, 
Skelton Affidavit); and (2) those of ISP's accident reconstruction training materials that 
had been authored by Cpl. Rice.6 (See Notice of Filing in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial (dated Dec. 22, 2008).) Cpl. Rice's training materials are 
5 When it prepared its memorandum, the State had not yet the opportunity to review 
Mr. Ellington's memorandum and, therefore, did not know that Mr. Ellington would argue 
for application of the Scroggins standard. (See New Trial Tr., p.4, Ls.4-20.) 
6 The district court also failed to file stamp Mr. Ellington's late December 2008 filing. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that that it was submitted at least as of December 29, 2008. 
(See Supp. R., p.25 (court minutes from December 29, 2008 hearing, wherein both the 
prosecutor and the judge indicated that they had received Mr. Ellington's supplemental 
filing).) 
Mr. Ellington's Notice of Filing in Support of Defendant's Motion for New Trial, the 
Skelton Affidavit, and the training materials are all attached to Mr. Ellington's Motion to 
Augment Record, which is filed contemporaneously herewith. 
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particularly noteworthy because they demonstrate that, although Cpl. Rice testified at 
Mr. Ellington's trial that "there is no average perception reaction time in the world," and 
that Dr. Skelton's use of a 1.5 second perception-reaction time in his calculations was 
therefore inappropriate, he actually instructs his accident reconstruction students as 
follows: 
Reaction and Perception 
• Perception is defined as the comprehending of a situation, such as a 
hazard, by means of the sense and mind. Reaction times of drivers in 
traffic are quite correctly referred to as perception-reaction times, 
because perception of a situation is usually involved. Inattention or 
distractions may cause a delay in perception. When there is a known 
perception delay, it should be added to the reaction time. In many 
instances, actual perception immediately follows the point of possible 
perception and there is no perception delay. 
• Reaction is a person's voluntary or involuntary response to a hazard or 
other situation that has been perceived. 
• Reaction time is the length of time from when a person perceives a 
given situation as being a hazard to when he reacts to his perception. 
When a person's reaction time is unknown, a reaction time of 1.6 
seconds may be used for investigation purposes. This figure accounts 
also for any unknown perception delay and is therefore a perception-
reaction time. 
• Simple reaction is response to an expected situation, when braking 
when a traffic light turns red. 
• Simple reaction time involving an un-complex response, such as 
touching the horn, may be as low as 0.25 seconds. The reaction time 
to apply the brake pedal after a situation requiring braking has been 
perceived is from 0.50 to 0.70 seconds for most people. 
• Complex reaction is reaction involving a decision, such as takes place 
when the driver has to decide quickly whether to press the accelerator 
or step on the brake pedal. Reaction time in such instances can be as 
high as 3.0 seconds or more. 
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Example 
A vehicle was traveling 50 mph (80 km/h). The driver perceived a 
hazard-a child running out onto the roadway in front of his car-and 
reacted. The drive had a perception-reaction time of 1.6 seconds. The 
distance the vehicle traveled during his perception-reaction time. 
d=Sx1.466xt 
d = 50 x 1.466 x 1.6 
d=117.28ft 
(Traffic Collision Investigation ~~ 38-44 (italics and bold text in original; underlining 
added).)? 
On March 16, 2009, the district court issued an order denying Mr. Ellington's 
motion for a new trial. (Supp. R., pp.32-45.) In that order, the district court ruled that 
the applicable standard in this case is the four-pronged Drapeau standard applies 
where the defendant seeks a new trial on the basis of new evidence showing that a 
witness for the State committed perjury (other than witness's recantation). (Supp. 
R., pp.36-38.) Applying the Drapeau standard, the district court concluded that 
Mr. Ellington's new evidence concerning Cpl. Rice's perjury8 was new to the defense 
? The document entitled "Traffic Collision Investigation" is one of many documents 
authored by Cpl. Rice and included within the training materials ATTACHED TO Mr. 
Ellington's Motion to Augment. Unfortunately, there is no good way to direct this Court 
to the precise location of that document in the training materials. 
8 The district court chastised the State and Cpl. Rice while remaining diplomatically 
noncommittal as to Cpl. Rice's motives: 
This court would be remiss not to express some concern about the 
integrity of the witness that has been called into question in this case. 
This is especially true when it pertains to a trained professional with the 
Idaho State Police. The citizens of this state should be entitled to expect 
the highest of standards from this institution. Any intentional or careless 
manipulation of the truth motivated to accomplish a perceived just or moral 
result is unacceptable. 
The court in this case has a limited snapshot of the inconsistent 
testimony of Fred Rice and therefore it is difficult to conclude that he has 
intentionally or carelessly attempted to mislead the Ellington jury. 
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and unknown at the time of trial, and that the defense's lack of knowledge of this 
evidence at the time of trial was not attributable to a lack of diligence on the part of the 
defense. (Supp. R, pAO.) Ultimately, however, the district court concluded that this 
new evidence was not material, but merely impeaching (Supp. R, ppA3-45), and that it 
would not be likely to produce an acquittal (Supp. R, ppAO-43, 45). 
On April 13, 2009, Mr. Ellington filed a new notice of appeal which, of course, 
was timely from the district court's March 16, 2009 order denying his motion for a new 
trial. (Supp. R, ppA7-49.) Rather than open a new appellate case, however, the 
district court created a supplemental transcript and record under the existing case 
number. Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court granted Mr. Ellington leave to file the 
present Supplemental Appellant's Brief. In this brief, Mr. Ellington presents one 
additional issue: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion 
for a new trial. 
Certainly the defense has pointed out a valid basis upon which they might 
be able to impeach the testimony of Rice .... 
(Supp. R, pA3.) 
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ISSUES 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington presented the following four questions for 
this Court's consideration: 
1. Did the State engage in numerous acts of misconduct which, when 
considered in context, render Mr. Ellington's trial so fundamentally unfair that 
he is now entitled to a new trial? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting certain highly prejudicial evidence? 
3. Is Mr. Ellington entitled to a new trial based on the fact that the entire panel of 
prospective jurors in his case was tainted by three prospective jurors who 
expressed their opinions that he was guilty? 
4. Did the accumulation of errors in this case deprive Mr. Ellington of a fair trial? 
While the foregoing issues are still before this Court, they are not discussed 
herein. Rather, through this Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington presents a 
fifth question for this Court's consideration: 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ellington's motion for 
a new trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Ellington's Motion For A New 
Trial 
A. Introduction 
As the foregoing Statement of Facts illustrates, at Mr. Ellington's trial, Cpl. Rice, 
one of the State's accident reconstruction experts, testified falsely concerning 
fundamental, yet critical, principles of accident reconstruction. The question on appeal 
is whether the character of that false testimony, when viewed in the larger context of 
Mr. Ellington's case, is such that the district court should have granted Mr. Ellington's 
motion for a new trial. 
As set forth below, there are two competing standards for evaluating a motion for 
a new trial based on new evidence where the new evidence consists of evidence of 
perjury by a government witness, other than the witness' own recantation. One of those 
standards was set forth in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), and 
the other one was set forth in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985). 
While Mr. Ellington argues that the Scroggins standard applies in this case, for the 
reasons set forth fully below, it is apparent that, regardless of which standard applies, 
the district court erred in declining to grant his motion for a new trial. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
1. General Standards Governing A Motion For A New Trial 
Idaho law provides that a defendant in a criminal case, after having been found 
guilty, may seek a new trial under certain limited circumstances. See I.C. § 19-2406. 
Section 19-2406 identifies those limited circumstances. 
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In evaluating a motion for a new trial, the district court must determine whether a 
new trial is "required in the interest of justice." I.C.R. 34; see a/so State v. Davis, 127 
Idaho 62, 65, 896 P.2d 970, 973 (1995) (explaining that I.C.R. 34 does not provide an 
"independent ground for a new trial" to be granted; rather it "states a standard to be 
applied by the trial court in considering" whether a new trial should be granted on any of 
the grounds identified in I.C. § 19-2406). Because of Rule 34's "interest of justice" 
standard, apparently, it is said that the decision of whether to grant a motion for a new 
trial lies within the sound discretion of the district court, and that decision, therefore, will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless the district court failed to perceive that it had 
discretion, acted outside the outer boundaries of its discretion, or failed to exercise 
reason. Davis, 127 Idaho at 65,896 P.2d at 65. Cf. note 9, infra. 
2. Particularized Standards Governing A Motion For A New Trial Based On 
Newly-Discovered Evidence 
As noted, Idaho Code section 19-2406 enumerates the possible bases for a 
motion for a new trial. One basis identified therein is "[w]hen new evidence is 
discovered material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence 
have discovered and produced at the trial. ... " I.C. § 19-2406(7). 
Generally, the standard employed in evaluating a motion for a new trial based on 
newly-discovered evidence is that which was identified in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 
685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976). See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 712, 864 P.2d 149, 
158 (1993). In Drapeau, the Idaho Supreme Court, relying on a treatise on federal 
practice, had held that a motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence 
should be granted where the following four conditions are met: 
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(1) ... the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the 
defendant at the time of trial; (2) ... the evidence is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) ... it will probably produce an acquittal; and 
(4) ... failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on 
the part of the defendant. 9 
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 678 (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal § 557, at 515 (1969)). 
Nine years after Drapeau was decided, however, the Idaho Supreme Court 
adopted a slightly different standard for evaluating a motion for a new trial based on 
new evidence in the narrow circumstance where the new evidence indicates that a 
government witness testified falsely. State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 384-85, 716 
P.2d 1152, 1156-57 (1985). In Scroggins, a case in which the defendant claimed that a 
government witness had recanted his trial testimony, the Court adopted the rationale of 
a Seventh Circuit case10 in holding that a motion for a new trial should be granted when: 
(1) a government witness's testimony is false; (2) without the false testimony, the jury 
might have reached a different result; and (3) the defendant did not know of, or could 
not adequately respond to, the false testimony at the time of trial. Id. 
9 In light of the Drapeau standard, which clearly calls for fact-finding and legal 
determinations by the district court, it is difficult to imagine how the decision to grant a 
motion for a new trial could be discretionary. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the 
Idaho Supreme Court recently overruled this "discretionary" standard (at least for 
motions for new trials based on newly-discovered evidence) in everything but name: "A 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence involves questions of both 
fact and law. An abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court's findings of fact are 
not supported by substantial evidence or if the trial court does not correctly apply the 
law." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008). 
10 The case relied upon by the Court in Scroggins was Larrison v. United States, 24 
F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). Although Larrison was overruled by the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004), no 
Idaho court has repudiated the Scroggins standard. See, e.g., Griffith, 144 Idaho at 
365-67, 161 P.3d at 684-86 (recognizing the continued viability of Scroggins even after 
the Seventh Circuit's overruling of Larrison). 
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As the Idaho courts have noted, the principal distinction between the Drapeau 
and Scroggins standards is that the former precludes a new trial unless a different result 
is 'probable,' while the latter requires only that a different result is possible. See State v. 
Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 366, 161 P.3d 675, 685 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Barlow, 113 
Idaho 573,578,746 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 
149, 152, 730 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Ct. App. 1986). Obviously then, the Scroggins 
standard imposes a less onerous burden on the defendant seeking a new trial than 
does the Drapeau standard. Accordingly, the State has traditionally sought to curtail 
application of the Scroggins standard by urging the Idaho courts to limit Scroggins to its 
facts, i.e., a government witness's recantation of his trial testimony. See, e.g., Griffith, 
144 Idaho at 365, 161 P.3d at 684; State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 571, 808 P.2d 
1313, 1316 (1991); Barlow, 113 Idaho at 578, 746 P.2d at 1037. Mr. Ellington 
contends, however, that the State's narrow interpretation of Scroggins is untenable 
because it is in conflict with the purpose behind the Scroggins standard; it is 
inconsistent with the Scroggins decision itself, and it is incompatible with some of the 
decisions interpreting and applying Scroggins, and attempting to reconcile the 
Scroggins and Drapeau standards. 
While the reported decisions demonstrate that the Scroggins standard has 
properly been applied in most recantation situations,11 there is no definitive authority for 
11 See, e.g., Bean v. State, 119 Idaho 645, 646-48, 809 P.2d 506, 507-09 (Ct. App. 
1990), aff'd by 119 Idaho 632,809 P.2d 493 (1991); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 
150-53, 730 P.2d 1069, 1070-1073 (Ct. App. 1986); cr., e.g., State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 
904,914-15,908 P.2d 1211, 1221-22 (1995) (recognizing that the Scroggins standard 
applies to recantation situations, and that a recantation was at-issue in the case at 
hand, but nevertheless applying the Drapeau standard because the recantation had 
been retracted); State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 864 P.2d 149 (1993) (same). But see 
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the proposition that the Scroggins standard is limited to recantation situations and 
cannot be applied to perjury claims generally. Indeed, as recently as 1991, the Idaho 
Supreme Court specifically declined to address the State's argument that the Scroggins 
standard is strictly limited to recantation scenarios and cannot be applied to other 
perjury-based claims. 12 Ramos, 119 Idaho at 571,808 P.2d at 1316.13 
State v. Davis, 127 Idaho 62, 65, 896 P.2d 970, 973 (1995) (calling the Drapeau 
standard the "the correct legal standard" for evaluating a motion for a new trial premised 
upon a govemment witness's recantation of her trial testimony, even though the 
recantation had not been retracted). 
12 The Supreme Court did not reach this issue because the trial court had found that the 
testimony in question had not been perjured. Ramos, 119 Idaho at 571,808 P.2d at 
1316. Justice Bistline, however, disagreed with the majority on this point, concluding 
that the district court had erred because the testimony in question was "necessarily 
perjured." Id. at 576, 808 P.2d at 1321 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Bistline 
would have moved on to the next logical question-whether the Scroggins standard 
applies when perjury is proven is established by means other than recantation-and, 
notably, he would have held that the Scroggins standard does, in fact, apply to all new 
trial motions that are based on perjury by a government witness. Id. at 576-77, 808 
P.2d at 1321-22 (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
13 Subsequently, in Fields, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the denial of two 
separate new trial claims based on perjury by government witnesses. One of the claims 
was supported by the statements of third parties, while the other claim was supported 
by the witness' own statements recanting his trial testimony. Interestingly, the Supreme 
Court applied the Drapeau standard to both claims. 
With regard to the claim that was supported by the witness' own recantation, the 
Court's holding in Fields is not remarkable because the Court specifically identified the 
Scroggins standard, noted that that standard would typically apply to such claims, and 
explained that, consistent with its holding in Ransom, supra, Scroggins does not apply 
where the recantation has been retracted by the witness. 
The Court's holding with regard to the claim of perjury that was supported by the 
testimony of third parties is, however, somewhat remarkable. While the State will 
undoubtedly argue that this portion of Fields represents the Supreme Court's intent to 
limit the reach of Scroggins, such an argument would read far too much into the Fields 
Court's use of the Drapeau standard in this context. Indeed, given that just two years 
earlier, in Ransom, the Court had recognized that there was an open question as to 
whether Drapeau or Scroggins applied in the situation then at hand, and had specifically 
declined to decide that issue, it would have been very strange for the Supreme Court to 
have decided this question in Fields without even acknowledging Scroggins' existence. 
See Fields, 127 Idaho at 913-14,908 P.2d at 1220-21. Thus, a more logical reading of 
Fields is that the question of whether the Scroggins standard applied was not even 
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Following Ramos, the Court of Appeals issued arguably inconsistent opinions on 
the question of whether the Drapeau standard or, instead, the Scroggins standard, 
applies to a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, other than 
recantation, of perjury by a government witness. As noted (see note 13, supra), in 
Cootz, the Court of Appeals, without any contemplation of a competing standard, 
applied the Drapeau standard to non-recantation evidence of perjury. Cootz, 129 Idaho 
at 365-67, 924 P.2d at 627-29. On the other hand, just four years later, in State v. 
Dunn, 124 Idaho 165, 170-71, 997 P.2d 626, 631-32 (Ct. App. 2000), the Court of 
Appeals applied the Scroggins standard to non-recantation evidence of perjury (again, 
without any contemplation of a competing standard). 
More recently, in State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 161 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2007), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals finally addressed the fact that there are still competing 
standards for evaluating new trial motions premised upon new, non-recantation 
evidence of perjury by a government witness. Id. at 365-67, 161 P.3d 684-86. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals opined in dicta that the Scroggins test applies only to 
recantation evidence, and that "[a]ny other type of new evidence presented by a 
before the Court. Cf. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 147, 191 P.3d 217, 225 (2008) 
(applying the Drapeau standard to a motion for a new trial based on a claim of perjury of 
a government witness, as proved through extrinsic evidence, in a case where the 
defendant-appellant did not argue for application of the Scroggins standard). 
This Court should note that in Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 924 P.2d 622 
(Ct. App. 1996), the Court of Appeals issued an opinion that is strikingly similar to 
Fields. In Cootz, the Court of Appeals applied the Scroggins standard to the 
recantation-based evidence of perjury, and applied the Drapeau standard to the other 
evidence of perjury. Id. at 365-67, 924 P.2d at 627-29. In applying Drapeau to the 
other evidence, the Court of Appeals never even mentioned the possibility that 
Scroggins might apply, see id. at 365-67, 924 P.2d at 627-29; thus, one must wonder 
whether the petitioner even argued for application of the Scroggins standard with regard 
to that evidence. 
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defendant as an alleged basis for a new trial, including other types of proof of perjury 
and evidence of a recantation that has itself been subsequently disavowed by the trial 
witness are subject to the Drapeau test." Id. at 366, 161 P.3d at 685. Furthermore, in a 
footnote, the Court of Appeals dismissed its earlier use of the Scroggins test (in Dunn) 
as "an apparent inadvertent aberration." Id. at 367 n.3, 161 P.3d 686 n.3. 
The Court of Appeals' dicta in Griffith, however, is not compelling. A close look 
at the rationale behind the Scroggins test, as well as the cases interpreting and applying 
that standard, reveals that application of that standard to new trial motions based upon 
discovery of new, non-recantation evidence of perjury by a government witness is 
wholly appropriate. 
Although Scroggins itself did involve an alleged recantation, the language of the 
Supreme Court in that case suggests that its holding was not limited to recantation 
situations; that language was broad enough to encompass all motions for new trials 
based on claims of perjury: "In Larrison . .. , the court held that where a party contends 
that a government witness falsely testified at trial, the following elements must be 
met .... " Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-85,716 P.2d at 1156-57 (emphasis added). 
Subsequently, in Lawrence, supra, the first published decision to attempt to 
reconcile the Drapeau and Scroggins standards, the Court of Appeals noted that 
Scroggins had set forth the standard for dealing with "recanted testimony"; however, in 
explaining why recanted testimony ought to be treated differently than other new 
evidence, it presented a compelling argument for applying the Scroggins standard to all 
claims of perjury, not just claims of perjury based on the witness's own recantation: 
A second approach has been to treat recanted testimony as a 
problem distinct from newly discovered evidence. Perjured testimony 
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affects the integrity of the judicial process in a way that overlooked 
evidence does not. Moreover, while a rigorous standard for obtaining a 
second trial upon new evidence may be justified as an incentive for the 
parties to marshal evidence and to present it at the first trial, the parties 
need no such incentive to combat perjury. 
Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 151-52, 730 P.2d at 1071-72 (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added) (quoted with approval in State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 874, 781 P.2d 197, 
211 (1989), and State v. Bean, 119 Idaho 632,637,809 P.2d 493, 498 (1991) (Bistline, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
Likewise, in Barlow, supra, the Court of Appeals continued, very reasonably, to 
read Scroggins as applying to all deliberately false testimony from a government 
witness: 
The Larrison test has been applied by courts where the trial judge 
is satisfied that a witness has given intentionally false testimony. As this 
Court explained in Lawrence, we require a less demanding demonstration 
of prejudicial impact in the Larrison context because "perjured testimony 
affects the integrity of the judicial process in a way that overlooked 
testimony does not." 
Barlow, 113 Idaho at 578,746 P.2d at 1037 (citations omitted) (quoting Lawrence, 112 
Idaho at 151, 730 P.2d at 1071). 
Finally, as noted above (see note 12, supra), in Ramos, although a majority of 
the Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether the Drapeau standard or the 
Scroggins standard applies to non-recantation evidence of perjury by a government 
witness, it is clear that at least one justice would have applied the Scroggins standard. 
Ramos, 119 at 576-77,808 P.2d at 1321-22 (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
In light of all of this, Mr. Ellington respectfully submits that the Scroggins standard 
is the standard to be applied to all new trial motions based on new evidence of perjury 
by a government witness, regardless of whether the evidence of perjury is in the form of 
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the witness's own recantation. Accordingly, he asks this Court to apply that standard in 
this case. 
C. Under The Scroggins Test, It Is Clear That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Denying Mr. Ellington A New Trial 
As noted above, under Scroggins, in order to be entitled to a new trial based on 
evidence of a government witness's perjury, the defendant must establish the following: 
(1) the government witness's testimony was false; (2) without the false testimony, the 
jury might have reached a different result; and (3) the defendant did not know of, or 
could not adequately respond to, the false testimony at the time of trial. Scroggins, 110 
Idaho at 384-85,716 P.2d at 1156-57. Assuming that this Court concludes that this is 
the appropriate standard for evaluating Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial, for the 
reasons set forth below, it should find that Mr. Ellington satisfied it and, therefore, is 
entitled to a new trial. 
1. Corporal Rice's Testimony In This Case Was Indisputably False 
In Scroggins, the Supreme Court identified the first prong of its specialized new 
trial test as follows: the court must be "reasonably well satisfied that the testimony 
given by the material witness is false .... " Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384, 716 P.2d at 
1156. In this case, there can be little doubt that Cpl. Rice's testimony at Mr. Ellington's 
trial was false. 
As noted above, Cpl. Rice scoffed at Dr. Skelton's testimony about, and use of, 
an average perception/reaction time of 1.5 seconds. He testified that Dr. Skelton had 
no basis to assume a perception/reaction time of 1.5 seconds, or to use that figure in his 
calculations, in part, because "there is no average perception reaction time in the 
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world." (Tr., p.1679, Ls.4-25.) However, Cpl. Rice's claims were obviously false given 
that, in the Ciccone case, Cpl. Rice had assumed, and utilized in his own calculations, a 
0.75 second reaction time (which represents the reaction time half of the 1.5 second 
perception/reaction time that Dr. Skelton testified about at Mr. Ellington's trial) 
(Defendant's Exhibit B, p.65, L.25 - p.66, L.12), and that, in teaching accident 
reconstruction to techniques to other police officers, Cpl. Rice discusses 
perception/reaction times and specifically instructs them that, although perception and 
reaction times can be highly variable, if the reaction time is unknown, they should 
assume a perception/reaction time of 1.6 seconds in their calculations. (Traffic Collision 
Investigation ,-r,-r 38-44.) 
Moreover, as is also noted above, at Mr. Ellington's trial, Cpl. Rice testified that 
the location of a debris field is of virtually no utility in determining the location of an 
automobile impact, claiming that the only thing that the location of the debris field 
provides is evidence that a collision occurred somewhere on the roadway. (Tr., p.1659, 
L.24 - p.1660, L.13, p.1672, L.3 - p.1673, L.6.) However, this testimony was clearly 
false as well, as evidenced by the fact that, in the Ciccone case, Cpl. Rice had testified 
that the location of the debris field was a good indicator of the zone of impact of an 
automobile accident. (Defendant's Exhibit B, p.53, L.23 - p.56, L.4; Defendant's Exhibit 
A, p.1108, L.6-p.1110, L.20.) 
In light of the foregoing, the district court recognized that Cpl. Rice's testimony in 
this case was "inconsistent" with, and even "contradict[ed]," his testimony in Ciccone, 
and it took the time to "express some concern about the integrity of the witness [Cpl. 
Rice]," but it appears not to have made any finding as to whether the testimony was true 
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or false. 14 (Supp. R, pp.40, 43.) Nevertheless, it is apparent from the face of that 
testimony that it was, in fact, false. 
2. Without Cpl. Rice's False Testimony, The Jurv Might Have Reached A 
Different Result In This Case 
In Scroggins, the Supreme Court identified the second prong of its specialized 
new trial test as follows: "without it [the false testimony] the jury might have reached a 
different conclusion .... ,,15 Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-85,716 P.2d at 1156-57. 
Although the district court concluded that evidence of Cpl. Rice's false testimony would 
not have altered the outcome of the case (Supp. R, pp.41_45),16 Mr. Ellington contends 
14 Notably, the district court stopped short of a finding that Cpl. Rice "intentionally or 
carelessly attempted to mislead the Ellington jury." (Supp. R, p.43.) Insofar as this 
represents a factual finding on Cpl. Rice's state of mind, and to the extent that Cpl. 
Rice's state of mind is any way relevant to the question of whether Mr. Ellington is 
entitled to a new trial, Mr. Ellington contends that the district court's factual finding in this 
regard is clearly erroneous. See State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 155, 983 P .2d 225, 
228 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are not 
"supported by substantial evidence in the record"). A comparison of Cpl. Rice's 
testimony in this case to the true facts concerning the fundamentals of accident 
reconstruction reveals that he could have had no justification for testifying as he did, 
and his testimony could not have been the result of an honest mistake. Thus, although 
the district court was unwilling to say so, it appears abundantly clear in this case that 
Cpl. Rice did the unthinkable-he abused his position with the Idaho State Police, as 
well as his designation as an expert witness in this case, by knowingly giving false 
testimony in an effort to win a conviction. 
15 In Lawrence, the Court of Appeals characterized the test for determining whether, in 
the absence of the false testimony, the jury "might have reached a different conclusion," 
as follows: "The proper test is ... whether the [evidence of perjury] reasonably could 
affect the outcome." Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 153, 730 P.2d 1069. This characterization 
of the second prong of the Scroggins test has since been criticized as being an 
unprincipled re-writing of the Scroggins test, see Bean v. State, 119 Idaho 632, 637, 
809 P.2d 493, 498 (1991) (Bistline, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part), and, 
thus, the Court of Appeals has retreated to the original formulation of this prong of the 
Scroggins standard. See Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366, 161 P.3d at 685. 
16 The district court reached this conclusion under a different standard, the portion of the 
Drapeau standard which asks whether the defendant's proffered new evidence would 
"probably produce an acquittal." (See Supp. R, pp.39, 40-41.) As noted above, the 
primary distinction between the Drapeau and Scroggins tests is that the former uses a 
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otherwise; he asserts that without Cpl. Rice's perjured testimony, he probably would 
have been acquitted. 
As was discussed in Mr. Ellington's Appellant's Brief, this was an extremely close 
case-one where the jury very easily, and very reasonably, could have acquitted 
Mr. Ellington. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.52-53, 67-68, 76.) Although, in denying 
Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial, the district court downplayed the importance of 
reconstructing the collisions at issue in this case (Supp. R., pp.41-42), the fact is that 
that reconstruction was absolutely critical. Without Cpl. Rice's false testimony, the State 
had no way to rebut the conclusion (based on Dr. Skelton's opinion, that, under the 
circumstances of this tragic accident, Mr. Ellington did not have time to perceive and 
react to the presence of his alleged Victims) that Mr. Ellington simply could not have 
committed any crime because he did not have the time to form the requisite levels of 
intent for his alleged crimes. 17 Moreover, insofar as the district court focused on the 
"probably" standard, whereas the latter uses a "might have" standard. However, the two 
tests also differ insofar as the Drapeau standard asks what effect the inclusion of the 
new evidence "probably" would have had upon the jury's verdict, whereas the Scroggins 
standard asks what effect the absence of the perjury "might have" have had upon the 
jury's verdict. Compare Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978, with Scroggins, 
110 Idaho at 384-85, 716 P.2d at 1156-57. This is also an important distinction 
because, under the Drapeau standard, one would have to speculate as to how the jury 
would weigh the impeached testimony of Cpl. Rice and, as the district court implicitly 
pointed out, the jury might have still given some weight to his false testimony (see Supp. 
R., p.44), whereas, under the Scroggins standard, this Court has to determine how the 
jury would have weighed the evidence in the absence of any of Cpl. Rice's false 
testimony. 
17 As a reminder, the district court instructed the jury only on the implied malice theory of 
second degree murder, which required the State to prove that Mr. Ellington engaged in 
an intentional and deliberate act, with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious 
disregard for, human life. (Jury Instruction No. 16.) In addition, the jury was instructed 
that aggravated battery requires wither a willful and unlawful use of force, or an unlawful 
and intentional infliction of bodily harm. (Jury Instruction No. 20.) 
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evidence tending to show that Mr. Ellington was angry with the Larsens, he had 
previously feinted toward his pursuers in an effort to escape, and he had chosen to 
again turn around and drive in the direction whence he came moments before the 
fateful collisions 18 (Supp. R, pp.42-43, 45), and, based on this evidence, concluded that 
Cpl. Rice's false testimony did not contribute to Mr. Ellington's conviction, the district 
court's conclusions are unsupportable.19 The fact is that the district court overlooked 
the fact that, even if Mr. Ellington was angry with the Larsens, and even if he had 
feinted toward them much earlier that day, he was the one being chased; he was the 
one trying to avoid further confrontation; he was the one who was just trying to get 
away. Indeed, in light of all of the evidence in the case, it appears that if the jury had 
18 The district also falsely implied that, upon turning around on Scarcello Road, 
Mr. Ellington was intending "to use his vehicle to scare the Larsons off the roadway" 
(Supp. R, p.43); however, there is not a shred of evidence to support such a claim. In 
fact, the trial evidence clearly indicates that, after turning around, Mr. Ellington swerved 
onto a driveway apron and the shoulder in an effort to avoid Joel and Vonette Larsen as 
they drove the front of their Subaru into the side of his Blazer. (See Tr., p.615, LS.15-
16, p.766, Ls.9-11, p.767, Ls.5-9, p.811, Ls.16-19, p.950, Ls.9-13, p.1437, L.24 -
p.1438, L.15; Ex. H; Ex. L; see also Ex. 15 (photograph depicting the Larsen's Subaru 
blocking Mr. Ellington's lane of travel, as well as the driveway apron and shoulder that 
Mr. Ellington had to swerve onto in an effort to avoid the Subaru).) 
19 In particular, the district court found dispositive the fact that, instead of continuing to 
flee in the direction that he was going and calling the police for help, Mr. Ellington had 
chosen to try to lose his pursuers (as he had successfully done earlier that day) by 
turning around and going back the way he came: "his deliberate act of turning his 
vehicle into harm's way sufficiently demonstrated to the jury the implied malice 
necessary to support the murder verdict." (Supp. R, p.43.) However, while the district 
court's hindsight is 20/20 and, looking back, it appears that Mr. Ellington's better course 
of action probably would have been to continue fleeing westbound on Scarcello Road, 
and then onto highway 41 (unless, of course, the Larsens had caused a multi-vehicle 
accident on highway 41 or Mr. Larsen accidentally shot innocent bystanders in his 
efforts to force Mr. Ellington off the road), the fact that he turned around in his efforts to 
flee did not necessarily compel a finding of guilt. 
28 
not been lied to about purported weaknesses in Dr. Skelton's reconstruction, 
Mr. Ellington likely would have been acquitted. 
3. Mr. Ellington Did Not Know Of, And Could Not Have Adequately 
Responded To, Cpl. Rice's False Testimony At The Time Of Trial 
In Scroggins, the Supreme Court identified the third prong of its specialized new 
trial test as follows: "the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the 
false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until 
after the trial .... " Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384, 716 P.2d at 1156. Later, in Lawrence, 
the Court of Appeals cautioned that this third prong of the Scroggins test "may invite 
misunderstanding if given a superficial reading," and it explained that this prong: 
does not require that the falsity of the [perjuredj20 testimony be wholly 
unknown at trial. Rather, it requires that a defendant be diligent in 
determining whether false testimony will be presented and in offering any 
available evidence to rebut it. . .. A defendant cannot knowingly let false 
testimony enter the record unchallenged, and then seek a "second bite at 
the apple" if convicted. 
Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 152 n.2, 730 P.2d at 1072 n.2. 
In this case, although the falsity of Cpl. Rice's testimony would have been 
apparent to the defense as soon as that testimony was given (because, of course, not 
only had Dr. Skelton already testified as to the truth, but he was apparently present in 
the courtroom when Cpl. Rice testified (see Tr., p.1715, Ls.21-25», the defense could 
not have anticipated that false testimony or been prepared to demonstrate the falsity of 
that testimony at the time of trial. Cpl. Rice had prepared no report in this case (Supp. 
R., p.7; Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial, p.7), and the only disclosure 
20 The Court of Appeals used the word "recanted," see Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 152 n.2, 
730 P.2d at 1072 n.2; however, as argued above, Mr. Ellington contends that the 
Scroggins test applies to all perjured testimony, not just recanted testimony. 
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that the State had provided as to the content of his anticipated testimony was that it 
would be similar to that of Detective Daly (Memorandum in Support of Motion for New 
Trial, pp.7-8), one of the other accident reconstructionists proffered by the State. 
Moreover, the defense could not have anticipated that, while under oath, Cpl. Rice 
would blatantly lie about fundamental principles of accident reconstruction. Of course, 
as the district court pointed out, defense counsel could have asked Dr. Skelton about 
Cpl. Rice's false testimony during the surrebuttal portion of its case (see Supp. 
R., p.44); however, there would have been no value to doing so since it would not have 
shown Cpl. Rice's testimony to be false, only inconsistent with Dr. Skelton's testimony 
(which the jury had already heard). In this case, the only way to have exposed 
Cpl. Rice's testimony as false was demonstrate its falsity with extrinsic evidence of 
Cpl. Rice's own inconsistent statements, which simply could not have been gathered in 
advance, and held at the ready, in the absence of some advance notice that Cpl. Rice 
would testify falsely about fundamental principles of accident reconstruction. 
D. Under The Drapeau Test, It Is Clear That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
In Denying Mr. Ellington A New Trial 
Although Mr. Ellington contends that the Scroggins standard applies in this case, 
even if this Court determines (as the district court did (Supp. R., pp.35-38)) that the 
Drapeau standard controls, it should nevertheless conclude that Mr. Ellington should 
have been granted a new trial. As noted above, under Drapeau, in order to be entitled 
to a new trial based on evidence of a government witness's perjury, the defendant must 
establish the following: 
(1) ... the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the 
defendant at the time of trial; (2) ... the evidence is material, not merely 
cumUlative or impeaching; (3) ... it will probably produce an acquittal; and 
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(4) ... failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on 
the part of the defendant. 21 
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 678 (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal § 557, at 515 (1969)). 
1. At The Time Of His Trial, Mr. Ellington Did Not Know Of The Evidence 
Proving The Falsity Of Cpl. Rice's Testimony, And His Failure To Learn Of 
That Evidence Was Due To No Lack Of Diligence On His Part 
In Drapeau, the Supreme Court stated the first and fourth prongs of the general 
standard for new trials based on new evidence as follows: "the evidence is newly 
discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial" and "failure to learn of 
the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant." Drapeau, 97 
Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 678 (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Criminal § 557, at 515 (1969)). 
As was discussed in Part C(3), above, although the falsity of Cpl. Rice's 
testimony would have been apparent to the defense as soon as that testimony was 
given, the defense could not have anticipated that false testimony or been prepared to 
demonstrate the falsity of that testimony at the time of trial because Cpl. Rice had 
prepared no report, the defense was led to believe that Cpl. Rice's testimony would be 
consistent with that of Det. Daly, and the defense simply could not have guessed that 
21 In light of the Drapeau standard, which clearly calls for fact-finding and legal 
determinations by the district court, it is difficult to imagine how the decision to grant a 
motion for a new trial could be discretionary. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the 
Idaho Supreme Court recently overruled this "discretionary" standard (at least for 
motions for new trials based on newly-discovered evidence) in everything but name: "A 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence involves questions of both 
fact and law. An abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court's findings of fact are 
not supported by substantial evidence or if the trial court does not correctly apply the 
law." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008). 
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Cpl. Rice would give sworn testimony that intentionally misstated fundamental principles 
of accident reconstruction. Indeed, the record in this case reveals that Mr. Ellington's 
counsel did not know of Cpl. Rice's prior, contradictory testimony in Ciccone until being 
alerted to it well after Mr. Ellington's trial. 22 (Supp. R., p.6.) Moreover, as the district 
court correctly observed, to say that defense counsel failed to exercise diligence 
because he failed to scrutinize all prior testimony from a potential rebuttal witness, 
would be an "unrealistic burden to be imposed upon the defendant." (Supp. R., p.40.) 
Therefore, it is clear that Mr. Ellington has satisfied the first and fourth prongs of the 
Drapeau standard. 
2. The Evidence Proving The Falsity Of Cpl. Rice's Testimony Is Material, 
Not Merely Cumulative Or Impeaching 
In Drapeau, the Supreme Court stated the second prong of the general standard 
for new trials based on new evidence as follows: "the evidence is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching .... " Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 678 (quoting 2 
C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 557, at 515 (1969». 
In this case, although the district court treated the evidence of Cpl. Rice's perjury 
as impeachment evidence only and, therefore, not "material" within the meaning of 
Drapeau (Supp. R., pp.43-44), the fact is that the evidence of Cpl. Rice's perjury in this 
22 Although it is not a fact that the district court appears to have considered, it is worth 
mentioning that there would have been no generally-available transcript of the trial in 
the Ciccone case unless or until both: Mr. Ciccone appealed his conviction, and the 
court reporter in that case had an opportunity to prepare and lodge the trial transcript. 
Thus, although Mr. Ciccone's trial was held in January 2005 and, therefore, preceded 
Mr. Ellington's AugusUSeptember 2006 trial by more than a year and one-half, this 
Court can take judicial notice of its own records and see that the trial transcript in 
Ciccone was not prepared and lodged with this Court and, therefore, would not have 
been available to Mr. Ellington's defense counsel, until July 31, 2007-almost a full year 
after Mr. Ellington's trial. 
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is both impeaching and "materiaL" Certainly, had Cpl. Rice's testimony from Ciccone, 
or his accident reconstruction training materials, been introduced during his cross-
examination in Mr. Ellington's trial, his credibility would have been tarnished (and, in 
fact, should have been obliterated completely). More importantly though (and as the 
district court apparently failed to grasp), that evidence would have done more than call 
Cpl. Rice's veracity into question; it would have provided substantive support for 
Dr. Skelton's calculations and opinions-all of which pointed to an accident, not a crime. 
3. The Evidence Proving The Falsity Of Col. Rice's Testimony, Were It 
Offered To A JUry, Would Probably Produce An Acquittal 
In Drapeau, the Supreme Court stated the third prong of the general standard for 
new trials based on new evidence as follows: "it will probably produce an acquittal .... " 
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 678 (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal § 557, at 515 (1969)). As noted above, this is a markedly different 
standard than the "might have reached a different conclusion" standard of Scroggins. 
Nevertheless, for the same reasons that the absence of Cpl. Rice's false testimony 
"might have" led the jury to acquit Mr. Ellington, so too is it probable that the evidence of 
the falsity of Cpl. Rice's testimony, had it been heard by the jury in this case, would 
have led to an acquittal. (See Part C(2), supra.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington 
respectfully requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated, and that his case be 
remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
DATED this 1ih day of November, 2009. 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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